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Abstract
Background: Doctors, lawyers and criminal justice agencies need methods to assess vulnerability to violent radicalization. In
synergy, public health interventions aim to prevent the emergence of risk behaviours as well as prevent and treat new
illness events. This paper describes a new method of assessing vulnerability to violent radicalization, and then investigates
the role of previously reported causes, including poor self-reported health, anxiety and depression, adverse life events,
poverty, and migration and socio-political factors. The aim is to identify foci for preventive intervention.
Methods: A cross-sectional survey of a representative population sample of men and women aged 18–45, of Muslim
heritage and recruited by quota sampling by age, gender, working status, in two English cities. The main outcomes include
self-reported health, symptoms of anxiety and depression (common mental disorders), and vulnerability to violent
radicalization assessed by sympathies for violent protest and terrorist acts.
Results: 2.4% of people showed some sympathy for violent protest and terrorist acts. Sympathy was more likely to be
articulated by the under 20s, those in full time education rather than employment, those born in the UK, those speaking
English at home, and high earners (.£75,000 a year). People with poor self-reported health were less likely to show
sympathies for violent protest and terrorism. Anxiety and depressive symptoms, adverse life events and socio-political
attitudes showed no associations.
Conclusions: Sympathies for violent protest and terrorism were uncommon among men and women, aged 18–45, of
Muslim heritage living in two English cities. Youth, wealth, and being in education rather than employment were risk
factors.
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Introduction
Studies of 9/11 show that as well as death and wounding caused
by acts of terrorism, health risks include chronic health problems
among emergency service workers and among exposed popula-
tions. [1,2] Terrorism is designed to promote fear and anxiety,
whilst direct experience of terrorist incidents can cause post-
traumatic disorders in adults and young people. [3,4] Further-
more, over-reaction or extreme counter-terrorism responses can
become restrictive and erode individual freedoms and the bonds of
a democratic society. [5,6] The indirect consequences include
social divisions between diverse religious and cultural groups, and
the undermining of social cohesion with significant implications for
health. [7] Once terrorists are captured, there is often a debate
about what motivated their behaviour, whether they came from
disadvantaged backgrounds, have predisposing psychiatric disor-
ders, and whether their acts were purely political. These issues are
considered during criminal justice and forensic psychiatry
assessments. For example, Victoroff has argued that depression
is a component in the process of radicalisation [8], an important
finding for both doctors and lawyers.
A great deal of effort and significant financial resources are
committed to counter-terrorism. There is less attention given to
researching preventive interventions. Health practitioners and
local government officials have targeted violence in the commu-
nity, including domestic violence, gun crime, as well as suicide and
bio-terrorism. [9–11] A similar approach has not been applied to
radicalisation, perhaps because this requires a better understand-
ing of who is at risk of developing these sympathies. Silber and
Bhat argue that radicalisation is a staged process that starts with
pre-radicalisation and moves through stages of self-identification,
indoctrination, and finally Jihadization. [12] We hypothesize that
a preventive intervention needs to interrupt the ‘pre-radicalisation’
phase, a period when individuals begin to develop sympathies for
extremist ideas or terrorist movements without becoming directly
involved. This is an accord with the preventive approach found in
public health in which a common antecedent of vulnerability to
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future illness or risk behaviours is targeted for intervention. A
better understanding is required of personal and situational
characteristics that are markers of this early phase of risk [13,14].
One of the challenges is the absence of a measure of the early
stages of radicalisation. Most previous measures were developed
and used in the Middle-East or in Muslim majority countries and
are designed to assess the extent of established commitment to
extreme terrorist action, rather than the early phases of
radicalisation that include the emergence of sympathies for violent
protest and terrorist causes. [15–21] Other studies developed and
tested tools to assess terrorists in contact with forensic services.
[18,20,21] The Belief Diversity Scale, for example, asked about
extreme ‘Middle Eastern ideologies’, including 33 items about
attitudes to Israel, women, politics, religiosity and the use of
religion to recruit terrorists, the West, and fighting for a cause.
[22–24] Kennedy et al (2008) developed a 47 item measure of
behaviours, attitudes and identity issues indicative of terrorist
intentions; this study was based on among 33 ‘insiders’ who were
considered to be ‘critics’ of Islam, ‘defenders’, or ‘mainstream’
Muslims. [18] Interestingly, the three groups expressed different
levels of concern and worry about the same behaviours and
attitudes. ‘Defenders’ were more likely to understate concern, and
Muslims who were ‘critics’ of the fundamental teachings of Islam
were more worried. Schbley (2003) used convergence of psycho-
metric measures from 356 suicide-bombers, taped self-immola-
tions of 15 terrorists and 918 ‘zealots’ to triangulate the data in
order to isolate relevant risk factors in a mixed-method design.
[19] This produced a 32-trait profile of a ‘religious terrorist’, an
ethno-religious specific description. The evidence identified the
following risk markers: predisposition to violence in the name of
Allah, susceptibility to joining a cult, susceptibility to dogma-
induced psychotic depression and affinity for martyrdom. This
study was novel in that it investigated psychiatric symptoms and
implicated psychotic depression and personality factors. A new risk
assessment instrument developed in Canada focused on convicted
terrorists. It assessed characteristics shared by terrorists from
diverse backgrounds: [20,21] ideologies, affiliations and moral
emotions, grievances about perceived victimization and injustice,
contextual factors such as contact with other extremists or
isolation, previous exposure to violence, and commitment to acts
of terrorism because of anger or ideology about the rewards of
participating in terrorism. In summary, these studies included
survey questions and forensic assessment methods. Most were
conducted in Muslim majority countries rather than in Western
democracies. None studied health status or explored the early
phase of radicalisation in populations.
Because the perpetrators of many recent, high-profile terrorist
attacks were citizens who worked and were educated in the
countries that they attacked, a core issue for prevention is how to
identify people who have no history of criminal behaviour but are
motivated to commit acts of terrorism. [25] For example, on April
2013, two men bombed the Boston marathon resulting in three
deaths and injuries to 264 spectators and runners. They both
appeared to have been integrated within US society. [26] The
murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby on 22 May 2013 was widely reported
in the media and by the UK government as a terrorist incident. It
involved two young men, both born in the UK to Christian
families and educated at the University of Greenwich. Having
been converted to a radical form of Islam, they planned the killing
of a British serviceman to highlight their opposition to UK foreign
policy, which they perceived as a threat to Muslim countries [27].
Radicalisation is the construct proposed to explain this
phenomenon. It is defined as a social and psychological process
by which ordinary citizens become so aggrieved that they are
willing to sacrifice their lives and the lives of innocent civilians to
make a political protest. [25] Much that is written about
radicalisation is based on the biographies of convicted terrorists
and those on de-radicalisation programmes [25,28–30]. These
histories are re-constructed and characteristics identified during
interrogation are uncritically assumed to be of relevance to the
early phase of radicalisation. Criminality, poor health, depressive
symptoms, risky behaviour in young men, social inequalities,
personality variables, international foreign policy and social
networks have all been proposed to be influential drivers for
grievances that lead to radicalisation. [7] In reality, little empirical
research has been conducted into the early stages of radicalisation.
It is still unclear what factors make potential recruits open to
persuasion to join a political movement that incites violent protest
and terrorism. This ‘open-to-persuasion’ phase is marked by
growing sympathies with terrorist organizations and political
causes that endorse the use of violence [12].
In this paper we take an interdisciplinary perspective, testing
health, social, and political influences on vulnerability to
radicalisation. We define radicalisation in accord with the British
Terrorism Act of 2000 as the process by which a person comes to
support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism.
[25] Violent extremism is described as endorsement of violence to
achieve extreme ends [25].
i) This paper describes the development of a new measure of
radicalisation that is based on sympathies for violent protest
and terrorism among men and women of Bangladeshi and
Pakistani origin and with a Muslim heritage.
ii) We assess the population prevalence of sympathies towards
violent protest and terrorism, and investigate the relationships
with poor self-rated health, anxiety and depression, and other
hypothesised determinants of radicalisation, for example, poor
political engagement, low social capital, adverse life events,
poverty, and migrant status.
Materials and Methods
Ethical approval was from Queen Mary, University of London
Research Ethics Committee. The study was also subject to an
independent monitoring committee chaired by a professor of
ethics in the law department at Queen Mary University of
London. No adverse incidents or issues were reported during data
collection. The work was undertaken with the support and advice
of a public involvement panel of local and national community
organisations with expertise and interest in the subject, including
representative of mosques, students, and health agencies.
Measuring Radicalisation
To develop a new measure of radicalisation, we consulted
Muslim and non-Muslim researchers and members of local
community panels (consisting of local charities and mental health
and educational organizations and religious institutions) about
how to measure radicalisation. This phase of enquiry orientated
our study within local and national sentiments and sensitivities. We
then held focus groups including people who spoke English and
were of Muslim heritage. They were selected as the study focused
on people who appear to be integrated in UK society rather than
recent migrants, in order to meet the objectives of the main study
(see Table 1). Snowballing was used to assemble the focus group
and aimed to draw people of Muslim heritage, and with a
background in mental health or social science or public health, in
order to formulate psychological and social-science constructs,
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together with ‘insider’ cultural insights and perspectives on
radicalisation. This was necessarily a purposive rather than a
representative sample, but was suited to the purpose of the focus
group; that is we aimed to identify suitable items for a new
measure of radicalisation, and to test the acceptability and face
and content validity of the survey questions. We did not include
criminal justice representatives in the focus groups because the
current knowledge and literature has already been informed by
such influences. In addition, we were advised that their
involvement at this stage might inadvertently constrain the
freedom with which focus group participants would offer their
views and would undermine our intention of eliciting community
perspectives. However, in our wider consultations we discussed the
study design with experts on terrorism, security and counter-
terrorism policy. This also assured compliance with legal
requirements.
There were two focus group facilitators: one of Somali Muslim
background (NW) and one of South Asian and non-Muslim
background. No financial incentives were offered to any partic-
ipants. A brief demographic questionnaire was completed and all
participants provided consent. Participants suggested specific items
to measure radicalization, and commented on the suitability of a
draft survey questionnaire, whilst dismissing some items if they
were too sensitive, lacked clarity, or if they did not reflect an
authentic Islamic perspective and might be misunderstood. The
focus group settled on seventeen questions as a measure of
radicalisation. These were piloted and tested in 8 individual pilot
interviews, in which subjects were debriefed and asked how they
felt answering the questions. Modifications to the items and
removal of one item as a consequence resulted in a 16-item
inventory of radicalisation (called the SyfoR), based on asking
subjects about sympathies for or condemnation of 16 different
actions The items reflected a range of actions that fell under the
heading of violent protest, violent radicalisation and terrorism;
these included sympathies for use of suicide bombs to fight
injustice or commit terrorist acts as a form of political protest.
Survey Sampling
The study included 608 people of Pakistani or Bangladeshi
origin men and women, aged 18–45, of Muslim heritage and living
in East London and Bradford. These cities were chosen because
they are home to a significant Muslim population of Bangladeshi
and Pakistani origin in areas of contrasting deprivation and
cultural integration with wider society. [31] Individuals were
recruited by proportional quota sampling. This is a standard
method that entails setting quotas for participants on a range of
demographic factors and ensures that the sample interviewed is
representative of the population of interest. Individuals living
within specific households within a sampling unit were identified
by door knocking and offered a computer assisted interview if they
gave informed consent. Flash cards were used to simplify the
process of answering questions with choices. Quota sampling offers
an alternative to probability sampling and is often used in market
research and national surveys [32–34], and becomes necessary if
there is no listing of all those eligible to be included. It is more
efficient as recruitment and sampling can be focused in areas in
which the desired population are resident but does require good
census data on the characteristics by which the quota are set. This
method is preferred if the costs of probability sampling would be
prohibitive and where feasibility issues become prohibitive. Given
the sensitivity of the survey and the specific sampling criteria, we
did not wish to expose large numbers of people who would not
meet our inclusion criteria to the preliminary recruitment phase.
Using UK Census 2001 data, quotas were set for each sampling
unit to reflect the key demographic variables of those living there.
Target quotas were set for age (18–30 years and 31–45 years)
gender, work status (working full-time, not working full-time) and
ethnicity (Pakistani and Bangladeshi). These quotas were based on
the expected number of Muslim households in each output area
(London and Bradford), which was estimated using the 2001
Census and mid-year 2010 estimates. Local areas were then
classified into a high, medium, or low concentration areas. Muslim
households were over-sampled from high and medium concen-
tration areas to ensure recruitment was efficient. Interviewers were
permitted to select any eligible resident from within the sampling
unit to meet their quotas, but a minimum of three houses were left
between each attempt to interview and only one interview per
household was permitted. The actual number of interviews per
sampling unit closely matched, and mostly exceeded the expected
numbers that were set ‘a priori’; only for Pakistanis recruited from
East London was there a lower number of actual compared with
expected numbers (5 rather than 10). Overall design effect due to
sampling within different areas of Muslim household concentra-
tion and non-response weights (expected population proportion/
actual proportion) were provided by IPSOS-MORI in order to
generate population level estimates of prevalence. The weights
were capped at the 97th percentile to reduce the impact of a few
extreme values, and the weights were rescaled so that the weighted
total equalled the unweighted total number of interviews.
Measuring Sympathies for Violent Radicalisation &
Terrorism
During the survey, subjects were asked to rate their support for
or condemnation of the 16 items of the instrument that we have
called the SyfoR. The responses were in the form of a 7-item
Likert scale with scores of 23 to +3. For all except two of these, a
higher score indicated greater support for violent protest,
radicalisation and terrorism. These two items, which asked about
sympathies for or condemnation of the British government’s
decision to send British troops to Afghanistan and Iraq, were
reverse-scored as condemnation reflected a more radicalized
perspective.
Demographic, Social and Health Characteristics
Questions to assess psychosocial and health risk were also
reviewed by the focus group and by the pilot interviews and
questions modified to make them acceptable and easily under-
Table 1. Demographics of Focus Group 1.
Gender Ethnicity Nationality Occupation
Female Bangladeshi British Psychologist
Male Pakistani British Psychiatrist
Male Iraqi British Psychiatrist
Female Turkish Turkish Student
Female Turkish Turkish Student
Female Turkish Turkish Student
Female Turkish Turkish Student
Male Black African British IT Professional
Male Black African British Mental Health
Professional
Female Iranian Iranian Student
Age Range 22–56.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090718.t001
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stood. As a measure of social support and strength of social
networks, we asked about the number of contacts by telephone,
email, or visit in the preceding two weeks by friends or relatives.
We asked about the proportion of the subject’s friends that shared
his or her own ethnic background (all or a lot, about half, none or very
few). Social capital is known to be related to violence, [35,36]
suicide [37] and mental health. [38] Given the constraints in the
length of the survey, we selected questions a number of questions
from the Office for National Statistics Social Capital Question
Bank [39] in order to tap the most important elements of social
capital of relevance to radicalisation. We attempted to ensure our
methods are replicable and comparable with other studies using
the same questions. Therefore, to assess social capital, we asked
three questions about satisfaction with living in the area (very
satisfied, fairly satisfied, neither, fairly dissatisfied, very dissatisfied),
trust in neighbours (may people, some people, a few, none), and
feelings of safety (very safe, fairly safe, fairly unsafe, very unsafe).
These were scored (higher score meaning more social capital) and
summed. The results are presented by total score and by each
item.
The questions to assess political engagement were drawn from
the Department of Communities and Local Government Citizen-
ship Survey. These asked whether individuals had voted in the last
local council election, discussed politics or political news with
someone else, signed a petition, donated money to a charity or
campaigning organisation, paid a membership fee to a charity or
campaigning organisation, done voluntary work, boycotted certain
products (for political, ethical or environmental reasons), boycott-
ed certain products for religious reasons, expressed my political
opinions online, been to any political meeting, donated money or
paid membership fees to a political party and taken part in a
demonstration, picket or march. The total number of activities
formed a measure of political engagement (scores 0–12).
Discrimination was assessed by questions from the EMPIRIC
study asking about physical assault, damage to property, insults,
unfair treatment at work, job refusal due to race, religion or
culture (score 0–5 for each item endorsed; total score 0–25). [40]
Life events were assessed by the 12 items from the threatening life
events inventory (score 0–12). [41] We also asked about
emergency department attendance or recent injuries, as indicators
of risky behaviour.
To measure general functioning related to health, four questions
used in the ‘Health & wellbeing survey of serving and ex-serving
members of the UK Armed Forces’ and adapted from the SF12
were used. [42,43] These self-report measures assessed global
general health (fair, poor, good, very good, excellent), reduced
social activities because of physical or emotional problems (a great
deal, a fair amount, a little, not at all), cut down on work and other
activities because of physical or emotional health (a great deal, a
fair amount, a little, not at all), and not being able to undertake
any vigorous activity because of health problems (no, a little, a lot).
These were each recoded to binary variables (poor/fair health vs.
rest; not at all/a little vs. rest; not at all/a little vs. rest; no vs. rest
respectively). These binary scores were summed giving a total
score (0–4).
Anxiety was measured by the Generalised Anxiety Disorder
Assessment (GAD-7) [44] and depression by the Patient Health
Questionnaire (PHQ-9) as total scores. [45] We asked about age
(18–20, 21–25, 26–30, 31–35, 36–40, 41–45), gender, marital state
(single or not), employment (employed, full-time education,
unemployed, at home for another reason such as retirement,
disability or looking after the house), personal annual income,
country-of-birth (UK or not). One question on religion asked
about the frequency of attending a place of worship (never,
monthly or less, weekly or more).
Data Collection
The data collection was undertaken by IPSOS-MORI, an
experienced social research organisation, which has previously run
community surveys of sensitive topics. Early pilot work indicated
matching by language was not necessary as the population of
interest were English speakers and the interviewers had much
experience of cross-cultural and cross-religious surveys, having
been involved in previous studies. It also has a workforce of trained
interviewers resident in the communities where the fieldwork took
place. Questions were asked in a computer-assisted format with
prompts and cues so that sensitive questions could be answered
anonymously. Individual consents were secured at the beginning
of the interview. Two sets of four interviews were undertaken to
pilot the questions. After each set, interviewees were de-briefed
and asked if they had understood the questions, and if they had
any recommendations to improve the flow of question and reduce
the burden to respondents. This process refined the questionnaire
so that the interviews could be completed within 30 minutes, and
served to improve the content and face validity of the survey, as
respondents were asked if concepts were not understood or did not
make sense to them. These pilot interviews were not included in
the main study sample.
Data Analysis
The items of the sympathies for radicalisation scale were
subjected to pairwise correlations (Spearman’s alpha) and inter-
item reliability tests (alpha), The raw scores are described without
weights, for each of the Likert options (23 to +3) as well as by
three categories: any condemnation (23 to 21), any sympathies (+
1 to +3), and neither (score of 0). If subjects did not know or were
uncertain they were coded as scoring 0. The items were then
subjected to a principal components factor analysis, with an
orthogonal rotation, to assess the factor structure of the new
measure, and to see if the items relating to non-violent and violent
protest, and terrorist actions were located within the same or
distinct factors.
The total score was calculated on the basis of the items
contributing to the factors that showed relevance following the
factor analysis. The score was then recoded into a binary variable
(score of 21 or less, versus scores of 0 or more) in logistic
regression models. Score of 0 or more were considered to reflect
those vulnerable to radicalisation. Univariate and multivariate
models included the potential explanatory factors. The multivar-
iate logistic regression model was built including age and gender,
and the variables that were significantly associated with being
vulnerable to radicalisation in the univariate analyses (at p = 0.05 level).
Only weighted models are shown, as the findings are generalisable
to the Muslim population from which the participants were drawn.
Odds ratios, 95% confidence intervals, p values and R2 values
were presented.
Results
Pair-wise Spearman correlation coefficients were calculated (see
Table 2) showing that sympathies for non-violent protest were
negatively correlated with all other items that asked about
sympathies for violent protest. The items asking about British
troops going to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan – reflecting attitudes
to international conflict-were also negatively correlated with items
on violent protest. The main items not related to international
Violent Radicalisation & Health Inequalities
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conflicts and non-violent protest otherwise showed good face
validity.
A principal components factor analysis with an orthogonal
rotation to improve fit showed four main factors (Table 3) which
we have named, radicalisation, defensive violence, going to
another country to fight British troops, and sending British troops
to another country. Thus, taken with the Spearman’s correlations,
the items relating to radicalisation and defensive violence were
well correlated showing good face and content validity; they
belong to factors 1 and 2. Factors 3 and 4 relate to British people
going to fight in other parts of the world and with UK forces or
British soldiers going to fight in other parts of the world. These
were intended to reflect attitudes to international policy, but
seemed to be separate factors and so were not used; furthermore,
the negative correlations of items in factor 4 seemed to suggest that
they way subjects had addressed these questions was not consistent
with our original framework of a positive score reflecting
sympathies for forms of violent protest.
We used the 11 items related to factors 1 and 2 as a measure of
sympathies for radicalisation (or SyfoR). The inter-item reliability
coefficient was 0.89, with an inter-item covariance of 0.85. The
total score produced by summing the scores of these 11 items was
used as a conceptually coherent radicalisation scale with good face
and content validity and internal reliability. The scores ranged
from 233 to 21. Thirteen individuals had a positive score (2.4%),
39 scored zero (6.41%), and the remainder had a negative score.
Of those with positive scores, one individual scored 21, one scored
10, one scored 7, and then two people each scored 1,2,3,4,5 or 6.
Given that the actions described in the items are violent, we
grouped those scoring 0, 1 or more as individuals who might be
considered vulnerable to radicalizing influences; that is, they did
not show outright condemnation of such acts and showed
sympathy or uncertainty. Using this binary outcome, logistic
regression analyses (weighted for clustering and non-response)
were completed for demographic, cultural, social, and health
variables (see Table 4).
Those at greater risk of sympathies for radicalisation had an
income of more than £75,000 but also included those who
declined to give financial information, those in education rather
than employment. Strikingly, many putative factors found in the
literature did no show any associations, for example, social
contacts, social capital, political influence, discrimination, fre-
quency of visiting a mosque for prayers, gender, proportion of
friends of the same ethnic background, and being single. One
social capital measuring feels of safety fell short of statistical
significance in univariate models.
The univariate analyses show a lower risk of having sympathies
for radicalisation in the 26–35 and 41–45 age groups compared with
the 18–20 age group; where total income is between £5000 and
£14,999 compared with income of less than £5000; amongst
people born in Bangladesh compared with those born in UK or
Pakistan; amongst those speaking a language other than English at
home; and amongst those with poorer general health.
The multivariate logistic regression model shows independent
effects of each variable (overall R2 = 0.374, X2= 77.11, N= 608,
p,0.001). Using the same reference groups as in the univariate
Table 3. Principal components analysis of the 16 items developed through focus groups to measure radicalisation (orthogonal
rotated solution presented) (obs = 575. 58 parameters).
Rotated factor loadings
Actions as part of political protests
F1
Radicalisation
F2
Defensive
Violence
F3
Brit. Citizens
Fighting UK
F4
Foreign
Policy
Take part in non-violent protest 20.519 0.257 0.264 20.141
Commit minor crime 0.5233 0.452 20.023 20.055
Use violence 0.728 0.34 0.079 20.075
Threaten to commit terrorist acts 0.812 0.161 0.235 20.159
Organise radical terrorist groups without personally taking part 0.783 0.191 0.222 20.116
Commit terrorist acts 0.805 0.128 0.266 20.138
Use of bombs to fight injustice 0.785 0.135 0.204 20.185
Use of suicide bombs to fight injustice 0.758 0.114 0.185 20.285
Violence to protect family 20.144 0.72 0.189 20.006
Violence by organised groups to protect own race/religious
group or tribe
0.201 0.719 0.133 20.182
Violence to fight police injustice 0.391 0.743 0.165 20.091
Violence to fight government injustice 0.426 0.701 0.171 20.129
People in Britain who went to fight against UK in Afghanistan 0.208 0.145 0.911 20.139
People in Britain who went to fight against UK in Iraq 0.226 0.125 0.903 20.127
Government’s decision to send UK soldiers to Afghanistan* 20.141 20.071 20.114 0.947
Government’s decision to send UK soldiers Iraq* 20.151 20.083 20.123 0.943
Variance 4.719 2.623 2.11 2.08
Proportion 0.295 0.164 0.132 0.13
Cumulative 0.295 0.459 0.591 0.721
*indicates reverse scored so sympathies are always consistently towards radicalisation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090718.t003
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Table 4. Logistic Regression Models showing univariate relationship with radicalisation outcome.
Characteristics Level N Univariate
OR 95% CI p R2
Age 18–20 91 1 0.12
21–25 121 0.28 0.07–1.11 0.07
26–30 140 0.05 0.01–0.25 ,0.01
31–35 106 0.11 0.02–0.53 ,0.01
36–40 81 0.35 0.06–2.11 0.25
41–45 60 0.1 0.01–0.57 0.01
missing 9 0.23 0.02–2.43 0.223
Sex Men 341 1 ,0.001
Women 267 1.42 0.49–4.12 0.52
In relationship Married/previous partner 377 1 0.02
Always single 231 2.08 0.71–6.06 0.18
Personal income ,£5000 82 1 0.15
£5000–£14999 149 0.19 0.05–0.69 0.01
£15000–£24999 86 0.33 0.06–1.96 0.22
£25000–£34999 40 1.41 0.20–9.70 0.73
£35000–£49999 24 4.46 0.54–37.08 0.17
£50000–£74999 26 0.34 0.03–3.57 0.37
.£75000 5 12.94 1.05–159.34 0.05
missing 196 4.17 1.24–13.96 0.02
Employment Employed 310 1 0.07
Education 84 6.22 1.59–24.41 ,0.01
Unemployed 79 0.68 0.16–2.97 0.61
HW or sickness 135 2.08 0.62–6.97 0.23
Place of birth UK 268 1 0.06
Pakistan 177 0.57 0.15–2.17 0.41
Bangladesh 163 0.19 0.07–0.53 ,0.01
Friends of same A lot/almost all 374 1 0.02
ethnic group about half 137 0.41 0.13–1.30 0.13
a few/none 95 0.46 0.13–1.70 0.25
Language used at home English 195 1 0.08
Other 413 0.32 0.11–0.97 0.05
Attendance to pray Never 133 1 0.008
, or =monthly 116 1.99 0.38–10.39 0.42
. or =weekly 355 1.08 0.38–3.02 0.89
Discrimination per point 608 0.79 0.31–2.05 0.63 0.002
Political engagement per point 608 0.6 0.31–1.06 0.08 0.07
Life Events per point 608 0.72 0.38–1.38 0.32 0.009
Social Capital (SC) per point 608 0.86 0.62–1.20 0.36 0.01
SC-Satisfaction per point 608 1.12 0.54–2.34 0.76 0.001
SC-Trust per point 608 0.82 0.45–1.47 0.49 0.005
SC-Safety per point 608 0.5 0.24–1.02 0.06 0.04
Depressive symptoms per point 527 0.97 0.86–1.04 0.66 0.002
Anxiety symptoms per point 562 0.97 0.87–1.09 0.64 0.002
Poor Health Score 0 411 1
1 60 0.51 0.13–2.0 0.33 0.07
2 44 3.49 0.8–15.24 0.1
3 57 0.08 0.02–0.35 ,0.01
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analyses, the following findings were significant. The findings of a
higher risk of radicalisation amongst those on incomes of greater
than £75,000 were sustained, however, the rather wide confidence
interval suggests this is an imprecise estimate (OR=44.14, 1.04–
1871.67, p = 0.05). Those who scored 2 on poor health (compared
with scoring 1) were at a slightly higher risk of radicalisation
(OR=4.12, 1.12–15.43, p = 0.03) whereas those scoring 3 or 4
were at lower risk (0.1, 0.02–0.53 and 0.01, 0.004–0.06),
respectively suggesting an inverted U shape relationship with poor
self-reported health. The language spoken at home was not
entered as this showed co-linearity with place of birth. For a
sensitivity test using just the six items in factor 1 as an outcome, we
repeated the multivariate model. Although there was less power
and the findings were therefore statistically not significant, the
trends were identical and similar characteristics emerged as
relevant risk and protective characteristics.
All those aged over 21 were at a lower risk of having sympathies
for radicalisation (21–25 age group OR=0.21, 0.04–0.94,
p = 0.04; 26–30 age group: OR=0.02, 0.002–0.1, p,0.01; 31–
35 age group: OR=0.05, 0.01–0.34, p,0.01). People with
incomes of £5000 to £14,999 were also at lower risk
(OR=0.16, 0.03–0.91, p = 0.04) than those with lower incomes,
as were those born in Bangladesh (OR=0.19, 0.05–0.68, p= 0.01)
compared with the UK.
Discussion
Findings in Context
This is the first study of common mental disorders and violent
radicalisation, taking account of social and political attitudes,
beliefs and health related behaviours associated with sympathies
for radicalisation in a minority Muslim-heritage population sample
of South Asian ethnic origin, living in Britain. It becomes clear
that sympathies for terrorist acts are very rare, yet some
individuals expressed strong support for serious acts. The
prevalence of sympathies is equivalent to that found in the study
of Muslim Americans [17] but much lower than found in Muslim
majority countries [15,16].
Two hypotheses have previously been proposed to explain
sympathies for radicalisation. [14] First that social and health
inequalities, poverty and discrimination, coupled with poor social
networks, poor social capital and unemployment produce griev-
ances. Secondly, that sympathies for radicalisation, are part of the
radicalisation process, and their emergence is entirely a political
process shaped by those in more influential positions and not
related to health problems, poor socio-economic status, or mental
health problems. [30] No previous UK based study has attempted
to investigate the relationship between depressive and anxiety
symptoms and sympathies for radicalisation and terrorism in a
British Muslim sample; measuring anxiety and depressive symp-
toms is also important as these are known to be associated with
suicidal ideas, poor health and premature mortality. [46,47] The
study showed that poor health or adverse experiences were not
influential in radicalisation. This study does not support the view
that sympathies for terrorist acts develop as a result of grievance
related poor health (physical and mental) and social inequalities, or
poor education or a lack of political engagement.
The trends suggest that people in education and high earners
were more likely to support radical acts; this may reflect accident
proneness and risk taking behaviour more generally, or this sub-
group may have much in common with gang members who
commit violent acts. [48] We did not have a measure of exposure
to war and conflict, which may be important in radicalisation,
however, we did assess life events including death, and assault and
we also assessed recent injuries resulting in hospital visits. The
association with recent injuries fell short of significance, and post
hoc analysis of individual events showed that only those who had
contact with the criminal justice agencies were more likely to show
sympathies (OR=23.45, 1.49–368.29), whilst loss events (job,
friend) appeared not to show associations. Future studies should
include detailed inventories of personality and risk-taking.
However, screening of those who attend emergency departments
is not justified. Those not reported poor health and those born in
the UK showed greater levels of sympathy for terrorist acts and
might be considered vulnerable to radicalising forces. Why poor
health is associated with less support for radical causes remains
unclear; perhaps illnesses and the limitations of functioning
become the focus everyday lives, although the relationship is a
complex one. Future work might establish the direction of these
relationships and measure health status more objectively, and
include detailed personality inventories to assess the role of crime,
gang membership and personality disorders.
Strengths and Weaknesses
The study shows it is possible to ask people about sympathies for
radicalisation and terrorism in a manner that does not offend or
lead to withdrawal. Such a measure permits testing of interven-
tions in populations an assessment of how to engage those who
might be disaffected. And there were no adverse incidents reported
to our data independent monitoring committee.
Although we cannot infer that sympathies for violent protest
and terrorism are necessarily linked to actual terrorist actions, it is
clear that sympathies and uncertainty, as opposed to condemna-
tion, are necessary ingredients for developing radicalised political
viewpoints and terrorist actions may follow. The findings are
proposed to be preliminary pending further study with larger
samples. Although, we used questions to assess social capital rather
than a validated scale, other indicators of exclusion using validated
scales appeared to show negative findings; for example, those
designed to assess discrimination and political engagement.
Preventive interventions for violent radicalisation as defined by
our measure direct attention to risk factors that do not easily align
with the reduction of social and health inequalities. There may be
Table 4. Cont.
Characteristics Level N Univariate
OR 95% CI p R2
4 36 0.01 0.001–0.10 ,0.01
Injuries A&E attendance No 515 1 0.03
Yes 93 3.29 0.90–12.07 0.07
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090718.t004
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sub-groups not represented in sufficient numbers within the
population who are at higher risk of radicalisation, for whom social
and health inequalities, and discrimination and political engage-
ment are more important. A larger study including other ethnic,
and cultural groups is required, along with further evaluation of
our new measure of radicalisation of sympathies for violent protect
and radicalisation.
What is Known?
N Violent radicalisation is a social and psychological process by
which people are influenced to take part in violent protest and
terrorism
N There are several theories about what makes people develop
sympathies for violent radicalisation and terrorism, the main
ones being that these emerge due to grievances about social
and health inequalities, discrimination, poverty, poor educa-
tion, poor mental health, poor political engagement and
attitudes to foreign policy are responsible
N There is little population research, and none that includes
Muslim population samples in England, and their health status
and their attitudes to radicalisation and terrorism.
What this Study Adds
N Sympathies for violent radicalisation were uncommon
N Young healthy people, in education rather than employment,
and born in the UK are more likely to sympathise with violent
radicalisation and terrorist causes
N People with poor health, migrants, and older people were
more likely to condemn violent radicalisation. Discrimination,
poverty, social and health inequalities, political engagement
and attitudes to foreign policy were not relevant.
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